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This Article argues that the Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
of 20061 (“TDRA” or the “Act”) represents a sensible and 
progressive reform of American federal antidilution protection.  In 
bringing a degree of clarity to a doctrine that the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”)2 did so much to 
obfuscate, the Act, read properly, significantly limits both the 
subject matter and scope of federal antidilution protection under 
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.3 Part I of the Article defines 
three forms of trademark dilution and identifies which forms of 
dilution the Act does and does not seek to prevent.  Part II briefly 
addresses the origins of the TDRA.  Part III analyzes the Act’s new 
standard for famousness and its reformulation of the law relating to 
dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment.  Part IV 
concludes.4
I. THE MEANINGS OF TRADEMARK “DILUTION” 
“Dilution” is probably the single most muddled concept in all 
of trademark doctrine.  One reason why this may be the case is that 
trademark commentators, myself among them, tend to speak of 
several different species of trademark dilution without identifying 
them any more specifically than by the generic name “dilution.”  In 
this Part, I distinguish three specific species of dilution: dilution of 
† Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva 
University.  Thanks to my Cardozo colleague Justin Hughes for extensive and detailed 
comments on a previous draft. 
 1 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 2 Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127 
(2000)). 
 3 15 U.S.C. 1125(c) (2000). 
 4 The Article does not directly address the “[e]xclusions” from protection set forth in 
Section 2 of the Act or the free speech aspects of federal antidilution protection as others 
in this symposium will do so. See Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act—A Consumer Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189 
(2006). 
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uniqueness, dilution by “blurring,” and dilution by “tarnishment.”  
The Part emphasizes that the TDRA seeks to prevent only dilution 
by blurring and dilution by tarnishment.  The language of the Act 
does not address and does not seek to prevent the dilution of a 
mark’s uniqueness. 
A. Dilution of Uniqueness 
In a seminal 1927 article,5 the trademark practitioner and 
scholar Frank Schechter introduced to American law the concept 
of trademark dilution.  By “dilution,” Schechter meant to refer to 
the impairment of a trademark’s uniqueness.6  His primary concern 
was to preserve what he variously termed a mark’s “arresting 
uniqueness,”7 its “singularity,”8 “identity,”9 and “individuality,”10 
its quality of being “unique and different from other marks.”11  In 
Schechter’s view, trademark uniqueness was worth protecting 
because it generated “selling power.”12  Certain very strong marks 
were not simply a means of identifying and advertising source.  In 
a new age of mass production, they were also a means of endowing 
the goods to which they were attached with the characteristic of 
uniqueness, a characteristic for which consumers would pay a 
premium.13
 5 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813 (1927). 
 6 See William G. Barber, A “Rational” Approach for Analyzing Dilution Claims: The 
Three Hallmarks of True Trademark Dilution, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 25, 43–44 (2005); Barton 
Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 681–82 (2004).  
For an important alternative reading of Schechter, which asserts that he sought to provide 
antidilution protection only to marks which are “synonymous with a single product or 
product class,” see Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 731 (2003). 
 7 Schechter, supra note 5, at 830.  See also Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 
17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 16–17 (1999). 
 8 Schechter, supra note 5, at 831. 
 9 Id. at 827. 
 10 Id. at 822. 
 11 Id. at 831. 
 12 Id. at 830. 
 13 Consider the four principles that Schechter set forth in support of his “conclusion 
that the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark [is] the only rational basis for its 
protection:” 
(1) that the value of the modern trademark lies in its selling power; (2) that this 
selling power depends for its psychological hold upon the public, not merely 
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Schechter believed, quite rightly at the time, that antidilution 
protection was necessary because anti-infringement protection, 
based on consumer confusion as to source, would not fully 
preserve the uniqueness of famous marks.14  In situations where a 
defendant used a famous mark on goods unrelated to those on 
which the famous mark normally appeared (e.g., KODAK pianos, 
ROLLS ROYCE chewing gum), consumers would not likely assume 
that the defendant’s product had the plaintiff as its source.15  Thus, 
no cause of action for consumer confusion as to source would lie. 
The beauty of Schechter’s original conception of antidilution 
protection was that it was relatively easy to put into practice.  
Uniqueness is an absolute concept.  A mark is either unique or it is 
not.  If a senior mark is unique in the marketplace and a junior 
mark appears that is identical to it, then the junior mark will 
destroy the senior mark’s uniqueness.  Thus, the test for dilution 
was an essentially formal one.  The judge need only consider the 
identity or close similarity of the parties’ marks.  If they were 
identical or closely-similar, then the loss of uniqueness could be 
presumed.16  Where the consumer confusion test was a messy and 
unpredictable empirical analysis centered on the consumer, the 
trademark dilution test was a simple and relatively predictable 
upon the merit of the goods upon which it is used, but equally upon its 
uniqueness and singularity; (3) that such uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or 
impaired by its use upon either related or non-related goods; and (4) that the 
degree of its protection depends in turn upon the extent to which, through the 
efforts or ingenuity of its owner, it is actually unique and different from other 
marks. 
Id. at 831. 
 14 Id. at 823–24. 
 15 Cf. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 
1912) (holding that BORDEN as used on ice cream does not infringe BORDEN as used on 
condensed milk). 
 16 Very much to their credit, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear to have 
appreciated this aspect of antidilution protection in their formulation of the factors that 
courts in their respective circuits should consider in finding dilution. See Eli Lilly & Co. 
v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2000) (considering similarity of 
the parties’ marks and the “renown” of the senior mark in finding a likelihood of 
dilution); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly mark similarity and, possibly, degree of 
‘renown’ of the senior mark would appear to have trustworthy relevance under the 
federal Act.”). 
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analysis centered on the trademark.  And like a true trademark 
purist, Schechter believed that the cynosure of the law should be 
the latter rather than the former.17
As the Sixth Circuit recently recognized in Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Division of Travel 
Development,18 Schechter’s original notion of antidilution 
protection was quite “radical.”19  The Ringling Brothers court 
observed that its “practical effect if fully adopted would be to 
create as the whole of trademark-protection law property rights in 
gross in suitably ‘unique’ marks.”20  Schechter’s original 
conception has never been enacted into law,21 and the language of 
the TDRA is careful to steer clear of it.  Indeed, in the early stages 
of the drafting of the Act, a form of antidilution protection based 
on “uniqueness” was proposed and rejected.22
B. Dilution by Blurring 
If Schechter looked to antidilution protection to preserve what 
the marketing literature now calls a brand’s “brand 
 17 As is not well-appreciated, Schechter deplored the operation of trademark 
infringement analysis, in which the court must estimate whether a consumer of ordinary 
sophistication would be confused as to the true source of the defendant’s goods.  In his 
still-authoritative history of trademark law, he argued: 
Any theory of trade-mark protection which . . . does not focus the protective 
function of the court upon the good-will of the owner of the trade-mark, 
inevitably renders such owner dependent for protection, not so much upon the 
normal agencies for the creation of good-will, such as the excellence of his 
product and the appeal of his advertising, as upon the judicial estimate of the 
state of the public mind.  This psychological element is in any event at best an 
uncertain factor, and “the so-called ordinary purchaser changes his mental 
qualities with every judge.” 
See FRANK SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-
MARKS 166 (1925). 
 18 170 F.3d 449. 
 19 Id. at 454. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12-13 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Hearing] (statement of Anne 
Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark Association).  See also id. at 22–23 
(testimony of William G. Barber on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association). 
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differentiation,”23 modern trademark law—and the TDRA with 
it—looks to antidilution protection to preserve what the marketing 
literature now calls a brand’s “typicality.”24  The law does so by 
offering qualifying trademarks protection from “blurring.”  The 
idea underlying the concept of blurring is that the defendant’s use 
of a mark similar or identical to the plaintiff’s mark will “blur” the 
link between the plaintiff’s mark and the goods or services to 
which the plaintiff’s mark is traditionally attached.  This 
understanding of “blurring” is well-settled in trademark 
commentary25 and case law.26  It forms the basis of the economic 
defense of antidilution protection.  As Judge Posner has explained, 
A trademark seeks to economize on information costs by 
providing a compact, memorable and unambiguous 
identifier of a product or service.  The economy is less 
when, because the trademark has other associations, a 
person seeing it must think for a moment before 
recognizing it as the mark of the product or service.27
 23 See generally DAVID A. AAKER, BUILDING STRONG BRANDS (1996). 
 24 See, e.g., Alexander F. Simonson, How and When Do Trademarks Dilute: A 
Behavioral Framework to Judge “Likelihood of Dilution”, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 149, 
152–53 (1993) (defining “typicality” as a brand’s “ability to conjure up a particular 
product category”). 
 25 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can 
Learn From Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1198 (2006).  Dogan and Lemley 
write: 
Blurring takes a formerly unique mark (say, Exxon), which consumers can 
associate with the mark owner without any necessary context, and applies it to 
unrelated products—say, Exxon pianos or Exxon carpets.  Even if the 
consumer understands that these different Exxons are unrelated, the 
proliferation of Exxon-marked products may make it more difficult for 
consumers to figure out which company is responsible for any particular 
product. (Quick: What does Delta sell?) 
See also David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of 
the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 129 
(2004) (“This blurring occurs because consumers no longer associate the famous mark 
with only one line of goods or only one source of goods.”); Michael Pulos, A Semiotic 
Solution to the Propertization Problem of Trademark, 53 UCLA L. REV. 833, 839 (2006). 
 26 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The 
distinctiveness of the mark is diminished if the mark no longer brings to mind the senior 
user alone.”). 
 27 Richard Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992).  Cf. 
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002).  In Ty, Judge Posner writes: 
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The beauty of the blurring theory of dilution is that it is 
emphatically empirical in orientation.  For the judge to find that a 
junior mark “blurs” a senior mark, the judge must find that the 
junior mark is causing consumers to “think for a moment” before 
recognizing that the senior mark refers to the goods of the senior 
mark’s owner.  A merely formal analysis of the similarity of the 
marks is insufficient.  The judge must evaluate the effect of the 
junior mark on the perceptions of actual consumers and must in the 
process take into account such factors as the degree of 
distinctiveness—or typicality—of the senior mark and the 
sophistication of the relevant consumer population.  The blurring 
theory of dilution thus restores the consumer to her rightful place 
as the cynosure of trademark law. 
Understood in terms of typicality and consumer search costs, 
the blurring theory of dilution is relatively straightforward.  
Nevertheless, it continues to perplex the courts.  This, I think, is 
largely the fault of antidilution plaintiffs.  Typically, antidilution 
plaintiffs seek to persuade the court that the antidilution protection 
provided to them by federal or state statute is the absolute, “in 
gross,” and formal antidilution protection that Schechter originally 
sought to implement.  Invariably quoting Schechter, they seek to 
argue that the statutes are designed to protect the “uniqueness” and 
“selling power” of their marks.  This, of course, could not be 
farther from the truth.  Anti-blurring protection is very different 
and far more limited in scope.  While two identical marks 
coexisting in the same marketplace will by definition negate each 
other’s uniqueness, they need not blur each other, i.e., they need 
not increase consumer search costs or otherwise require consumers 
to “think for a moment” before recognizing the respective sources 
[T]here is concern that consumer search costs will rise if a trademark becomes 
associated with a variety of unrelated products. Suppose an upscale restaurant 
calls itself “Tiffany.” There is little danger that the consuming public will think 
it’s dealing with a branch of the Tiffany jewelry store if it patronizes this 
restaurant. But when consumers next see the name “Tiffany” they may think 
about both the restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy of the 
name as an identifier of the store will be diminished. Consumers will have to 
think harder-incur as it were a higher imagination cost-to recognize the name as 
the name of the store.  So “blurring” is one form of dilution. 
Id. at 511 (citations omitted). 
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of the marks.  This is especially the case when one of the marks is 
very strong.  No one can seriously suggest that the typicality of the 
trademark FORD has been significantly diminished by the 
coexistence in the American marketplace of a modeling agency—
or of millions of people, for that matter—with the same name.  
Rather than engage in the hard work of showing blurring in the 
marketplace, perhaps with survey evidence, perhaps with 
testimony from actual consumers, plaintiffs tend to rest on the 
formal similarity of the parties’ marks.  Schechter would have 
approved.  But modern antidilution law, and the TDRA in 
particular, calls for much more. 
C. Dilution by Tarnishment 
In his original formulation of his theory of trademark dilution, 
Schechter had nothing to say about trademark “tarnishment.”  This 
should not be surprising.  Trademark tarnishment has simply 
nothing to do with trademark dilution as Schechter originally 
conceived of it.28  Nor does it have anything in common with the 
theory of blurring.  By tarnishment, we mean damage to the 
associations or connotations of a trademark.29  When a Las Vegas 
casino called its players club the “New York $lot Exchange,” it 
arguably tarnished to some degree the registered trademark NEW 
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE by implying that the latter is in some sense 
a venue for gambling, if not also for stacked odds.30  There is no 
blurring here, however.  Instead, the casino’s parody relied on and 
may very well have reinforced the consumer’s mental connection 
between the registered trademark and its source.  Nevertheless, 
 28 See Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseperable: Dilution and Infringement in 
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 983 (2004) (“While tarnishment now comprises 
one of the two flavors of dilution, Schechter said nothing about it.  Furthermore, 
tarnishment seems to be at odds with the entire concept of dilution.”).  See also Beebe, 
supra note 6, at 695–98. 
 29 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting 
that “‘[t]arnishment’ generally arises when the plaintiff’s trademark is linked to products 
of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke 
unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product[s]”). 
 30 See N.Y. Stock Exchange, Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 558 (2d Cir. 
2002) (reversing grant of summary judgment on the grounds that a trier of fact could find 
that the defendant’s use “would injure NYSE’s reputation” and thus violate New York 
state anti-tarnishment law). 
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rather than identifying tarnishment as a separate cause of action, 
something which the Congress originally set out to do,31 modern 
antidilution doctrine—both in the FTDA32 and the TDRA33—has 
incorporated tarnishment as a form of trademark dilution. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE TDRA 
The TDRA is the latest of several attempts by the Congress to 
establish a viable regime of federal antidilution protection.  All 
previous attempts—including, it must be said, the FTDA—ended 
in failure.34  In the 1930s, Schechter himself urged the Congress to 
adopt antidilution protection, and the Perkins Bill of 1932 included 
antidilution provisions.35  The Department of Justice opposed the 
bill,36 however, as it did most aspects of trademark protection at 
the time,37 and the bill failed.  More recently, the Senate version of 
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (“TLRA”) included 
provisions designed to prevent trademark dilution, which it defined 
as “the material reduction of the distinctive quality of a famous 
mark through use of the mark by another person regardless of 
[competition among the parties or likelihood of confusion].”38  On 
First Amendment concerns, these provisions were deleted from the 
 31 See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (2002). 
 32 The Supreme Court suggested in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 
432 (2003), that the language of the FTDA may not address tarnishment.  See infra note 
51 and accompanying text.  However, nearly all courts have assumed that the FTDA does 
in fact provide for anti-tarnishment protection.  See generally 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:95 (4th ed. 2005) 
 33 See H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006). 
 34 See generally Welkowitz, supra note 31, at 153–62. 
 35 H.R. 11592, 72d Cong. (1932).  As Welkowitz explains, supra note 31, at 154, 
Schechter actually testified in support of a different bill, known then and now as the 
“Vestal Bill,” H.R. 7118, 72nd Cong. (1931). 
 36 See 2 JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION & PRACTICE § 5A.03 
(2006). 
 37 See generally Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-
Marks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 183 (1949) (“Whenever there was a hearing 
before any committee on the trade-mark bill, sooner or later there appeared zealous men 
from the Department of Justice who raised all manner of objections.”). 
 38 S. 1883 § 36, 100th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988), 134 CONG. REC. S5864-02 (daily ed. 
May 13, 1988), S5868 (1988).  See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, The 1996 Federal 
Anti-Dilution Statute, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 587 (1998). 
BEEBE_PAPER_091606_CLEAN 9/17/2006  5:57:40 PM 
1152 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1143 
 
final version of the TLRA that emerged from the House-Senate 
conference committee.39  In 1995, the provisions deleted from the 
TLRA were revived and modified to become the FTDA, which 
defined dilution as, among other things, “the lessening of the 
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or 
services, regardless of the presence of absence of [competition 
among the parties or likelihood of confusion].”40  After a minimum 
of deliberation, consisting of a one-day hearing before the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property in 
which the seven witnesses all supported the bill,41 the FTDA 
passed the House unanimously and the Senate on a voice vote to 
become federal law.42
An idiosyncratic draft hurriedly enacted into law, the FTDA 
was wrong from the start.  After the original Lanham Act was 
enacted in 1946, a variety of courts hostile to trademark protection 
probed the act for weaknesses, all in an effort, one judge wrote at 
the time, to “cut this Act . . . down to size consistent with the 
court’s conceptions of public policy.”43  Many courts appear to 
have approached the FTDA with very much the same spirit.  The 
Second Circuit, and the influential Judge Pierre N. Leval in 
particular, took advantage of the ambiguous wording of the FTDA 
to deny its protection to non-inherently distinctive marks.44  Other 
circuits read the FTDA to require the plaintiff to present evidence 
of actual dilution, rather than of merely a likelihood of dilution.45  
Some judges and commentators questioned whether the language 
of the FTDA itself, rather than its legislative history, addressed the 
harm of trademark tarnishment.46  More recently, in an 
appropriationist art case, the Ninth Circuit read the 
 39 See 134 CONG. REC. H10411 (daily ed., Oct. 19, 1988); 134 CONG. REC. S16971 
(daily ed., Oct. 20, 1988).  See also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 
431 (2003). 
 40 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 41 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1032. 
 42 Id. at 1, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029. 
 43 S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 1949) (Clark, J., 
dissenting). 
 44 See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Comm., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 45 See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 46 See, e.g., id. at 452 n.1. 
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“[n]oncommercial use” language of Section 43(c)(4)(B) to mean 
that if the defendant’s speech contained one drop of non-
commerciality, “if it does more than propose a commercial 
transaction,”47 then the speech was immune to the prohibitions of 
the FTDA.48
Matters came to a head with the 2003 Supreme Court decision 
in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue.49  In a guarded opinion, the 
Court declined to define dilution other than to quote from the 
statutory definition.50  The Court did, however, question whether 
Section 43(c) created a cause of action for tarnishment.51  It also 
quoted in a footnote52 from Judge Leval’s Nabisco v. PF Brands53 
opinion, perhaps signaling that it approved of the Second Circuit’s 
restrictive interpretation of Section 43(c).  Most importantly, the 
Court read the language of Section 43(c) to require that the 
plaintiff show evidence of actual dilution, rather than of a mere 
likelihood of dilution, in order to be granted relief under the 
section.54  The Court acknowledged that requiring evidence of 
actual dilution may entail “difficulties of proof,” but explained that 
on the language of the statute, it could do no other.55  To soften the 
blow, the Court opined that “[i]t may well be . . . that direct 
evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be 
necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through 
circumstantial evidence—the obvious case is one where the junior 
 47 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 48 Id.  See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between 
Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive 
Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887 (2005). 
 49 537 U.S. 413 (2003). 
 50 Id. at 433. 
 51 Id. at 432 (“Whether [tarnishment] is actually embraced by the statutory text, 
however, is another matter.  Indeed, the contrast between the state statutes, which 
expressly refer to both ‘injury to business reputation’ and to ‘dilution of the distinctive 
quality of a trade name or trademark,’ and the federal statute which refers only to the 
latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of the FTDA.”). 
 52 Id. at 427 n.5. 
 53 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 54 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433–34. 
 55 Id. at 434 (“Whatever difficulties of proof may be entailed, they are not an 
acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory 
violation.”). 
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and senior marks are identical.”56  This passage has become 
notorious in American trademark law.  Some courts have read the 
passage to mean that when the parties’ marks are identical, then 
direct evidence of dilution is unnecessary because the identity of 
the marks is itself sufficient circumstantial evidence of dilution.57  
Other courts have read the passage to mean that when the parties 
marks are identical, then the only additional evidence that is 
necessary to show dilution is circumstantial, rather than direct, 
evidence (the so-called “identity-plus interpretation”).58  In 
 56 Id. 
 57 See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377 SAS, 2003 WL 22451731 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003), rev’d by Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 452 (2d 
Cir. 2004).  Judge Scheindlin explained: 
This sentence is not easy to interpret, as is apparent from the differing 
interpretations of lower courts.  Is the Court saying, as plaintiff maintains, that 
when the junior and senior marks are identical, that in itself is sufficient 
circumstantial evidence to prove actual dilution?  See Nike Inc. v. Variety 
Wholesalers, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (basing finding of 
dilution on identity of the marks).  Or, is the Court saying that circumstantial 
evidence of actual dilution, as opposed to direct evidence, is sufficient when the 
marks are identical? See Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431–32 
(M.D.N.C. 2003) (holding that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s marks in its 
domain names constituted circumstantial evidence sufficient to support finding 
of dilution because defendant’s use hindered plaintiff from engaging in 
electronic commerce under those domain names, hence “reduc[ing] the selling 
power of plaintiff’s marks”). 
Id. at *14.  Cf. Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 
2d 892, 902 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (“In view of the developing status of the law on the nature 
of evidence required, the court believes that the best course is to permit the plaintiff the 
opportunity to present its dilution claim to the jury.  The defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on this issue will be denied.”). 
 58 See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 452 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied 
by Savin Eng’rs, P.C. v. Savin Corp., 126 S. Ct. 116 (2005) (“We interpret Moseley to 
mean that where a plaintiff who owns a famous senior mark can show the commercial use 
of an identical junior mark, such a showing constitutes circumstantial evidence of the 
actual-dilution element of an FTDA claim.”); GMC v. Autovation Techs., 317 F. Supp. 
2d 756, 764 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (“GM’s evidence establishes actual dilution in that 
Defendant has used marks that are identical to the world famous GM Trademarks.”); 
Nike Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2003) 
(“[T]he Court concludes that Variety has diluted the Nike trademarks due to the identical 
or virtually identical character of the marks on the Accused Goods to the Nike 
trademarks.”).  Cf. Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Pro-Line Protoform, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 
1085 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“[W]hen identical marks are used on similar goods, dilution—the 
capacity of the famous mark to identify and distinguish the goods of the trademark 
holder—obviously occurs.”); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. McEvoy, 300 F. Supp. 2d 352, 357 (D. 
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resolving one split among the circuits, the Court created in this 
passage the conditions for another.59
With the effects of the Moseley opinion now being felt, the 
time has shown itself to be ripe for reform of federal antidilution 
protection.  And if the primary lesson taken from the 1988 TLRA 
experience and applied to the enactment of the 1995 FTDA was 
that “‘twere well / It were done quickly,”60 then the primary lesson 
taken from 1995 and applied now is that it were well it were done 
properly.  The TDRA is the product of extensive work by the 
International Trademark Association61 and the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association,62 as well as by the Section 
of Intellectual Property Law of the American Bar Association.63  
This work culminated in two hearings before the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property 
(CIIP).64  Representatives Lamar Smith and Howard L. Berman, 
the Chair and the ranking member, respectively, of the CIIP, both 
evinced close knowledge of the language of the Act in the 
questions they asked of the witnesses.65  The well-respected 
Professor Mark Lemley of Stanford Law School represented the 
academic community and gave level-headed testimony.66  An 
attorney from the American Civil Liberties Union spoke at both 
hearings to the First Amendment issues implicated by antidilution 
Md. 2004) (“Though dilution claims require evidence of actual confusion [sic], that 
requirement is satisfied when, as here, the defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark.”). 
 59 See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rhenquist 
Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 205–206 (2004).
 60 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act. 1, sc. 7. 
 61 See 2005 Hearing, supra note 22, at 6–21 (2005) (testimony and statement of Anne 
Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark Association). 
 62 See 2005 Hearing, supra note 22, at 21–29 (testimony and statement of William G. 
Barber on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law Association). 
 63 See Committee Print to Amend the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 13-33 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Hearing] (testimony and 
statement of Robert W. Sacoff, Chair, Section of Intellectual Property Law, American 
Bar Association). 
 64 See 2005 Hearing, supra note 22; 2004 Hearing, supra note 63. 
 65 See, e.g., 2005 Hearing, supra note 22, at 47. 
 66 See id. at 18–21 (testimony and statement of Professor Mark A. Lemley, William H. 
Neukom Professor Law, Stanford University). 
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protection.67  The civil society organizations Public Citizen and 
Public Knowledge subsequently became closely involved in the 
drafting process, particularly when the bill was being considered 
by the Senate, and won crucial amendments to the language of the 
Act.68  Unlike the FTDA, the TDRA is mature legislation and 
deserves to be read as such.69
III. THE TDRA AND THE NEW DILUTION DOCTRINE 
What, then, does the TDRA do?  Among its most important 
innovations are the following.  First, and most importantly, the 
TDRA provides that the plaintiff need merely show a likelihood of 
dilution in order to gain relief under Section 43(c)70—thus 
overriding the central holding of Moseley.  Second, it explicitly 
provides that non-inherently distinctive marks may qualify for 
antidilution protection.71  Third, it rejects the doctrine of “niche 
fame” and raises the requirements that a mark must meet to qualify 
as “famous” for purposes of the Section 43(c).72  Fourth and 
relatedly, it reconfigures the factors that courts should consider to 
determine whether a mark is “famous.”73  Fifth, it explicitly 
provides that both “dilution by blurring” and “dilution by 
tarnishment” are forms of dilution actionable under Section 43(c) 
and formulates definitions of “dilution by blurring” and “dilution 
by tarnishment.”74  Sixth, it sets forth factors that courts should 
consider to determine the likelihood of dilution by blurring.75  
 67 See 2005 Hearing, supra note 22, at 30–39 (testimony and statement of Marvin J. 
Johnson, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union); 2004 Hearing, supra 
note 63, at 33–43 (testimony and statement of Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative Counsel, 
American Civil Liberties Union). 
 68 See generally Public Knowledge, H.R. 683: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 
2005, http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/tmdilution (last visited August 4, 2006). 
 69 Nevertheless, to the extent that it prescribes “new policy,” it is probably properly 
characterized, in Judge Leval’s terms, as a “delegating statute” rather than a 
“micromanager statute.”  See Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 196–98 (2004). 
 70 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)). 
 71 Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)). 
 72 Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)). 
 73 Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–1125(c)(2)(A)(iv)). 
 74 Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), (2)(B) & (2)(C)). 
 75 Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–1125(c)(2)(B)(vi)). 
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Seventh and finally, it significantly expands the scope of the 
Section 43(c)’s “[e]xclusions” relating to conduct, such as 
“parody,” that is not actionable as dilution.76
In this Part, I will comment on only a few of these reforms.  In 
doing so, I will argue that the Act is in fact a progressive step 
towards a more restrictive—and sensible—application of federal 
antidilution law.  I begin with the Act’s new formulation of what 
qualifies as “famous” for purposes of Section 43(c). 
A. The New Standard for Famousness 
1. The Statutory Language 
The Act provides, in what will become the new Section 
43(c)(2)(A), that “a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by 
the general consuming public of the United States as a designation 
of source . . . .”77  This is an important new formulation that 
provides guidance to the courts on how famous a mark must be to 
qualify for antidilution protection, something that the FTDA failed 
to do.78  As was intended by the drafters of the Act,79 the use of 
the language “widely recognized” and “general consuming public 
of the United States” repudiates outright the strange doctrine of 
“niche fame.”80  It also significantly raises the bar for what 
qualifies as “famous.”  On this language, it is likely that marks 
such as INTERMATIC,81 LEXINGTON,82 or WAWA,83 which were 
 76 Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)). 
 77 Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)). 
 78 See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“The [FTDA] does not tell how famous a mark must be.  Nor does it provide any direct 
guidance as to how courts should answer the question.”). 
 79 See, e.g., 2005 Hearings, supra note 22, at 6 (testimony of Ann Gundelfinger, 
President, International Trademark Association). 
 80 On niche fame, see J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark Has Been Diluted: 
Theories or Facts?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 713, 731–33 (2004). 
 81 See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 82 See Lexington Management Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).  See also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 24:92.1 n. 14 (“The court 
found the mark strong enough that confusion was likely and erroneously concluded that 
therefore the mark was famous—a non sequitur.” (italics omitted)). 
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found to be famous under the terms of the FTDA, would not be 
found to be famous under the new terms of the TDRA.  None of 
these marks is “widely recognized” by the “general consuming 
public” of the entire country.  The TDRA’s new standard for 
famousness returns federal antidilution protection to its core 
principles.  The antidilution right is an extraordinary right that only 
extraordinary marks deserve.  In essence, and as was arguably 
originally intended by Schechter, the mark must be a “household 
word” to qualify.84
What the TDRA lacks in this regard, however, is something 
that it could not have been expected to provide and that the federal 
courts themselves must establish.  In the tradition of Justice 
Scalia’s “err on the side of caution” presumption in Wal-Mart 
Stores v. Samara Brothers,85 courts should, if in doubt, rule that a 
given mark is not “famous.”86  This is consistent with Congress’ 
goal in the TDRA to restrict the subject matter of antidilution 
protection only to truly deserving marks. 
The TDRA also establishes new factors for courts to consider 
in determining whether a mark is famous.  The FTDA set forth an 
 83 See Wawa Dairy Farms v. Haaf, No. 96-4313, 1996 WL 460083, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 7, 1996) (“There is simply no question that WAWA is a highly renowned, famous 
mark”). 
 84 See TCPIP Holding Co.v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“The examples of eligible ‘famous marks’ given in the House Report—Dupont, Buick, 
and Kodak, see H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1029, 1030—are marks that for the major part of the century have been household words 
throughout the United States.  They are representative of the best known marks in 
commerce.”). 
 85 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (“To the extent there are close cases, we believe that courts 
should err on the side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, 
thereby requiring secondary meaning.”). 
 86 One initial rule of thumb may be that if the finder of fact is a long-time resident of 
the United States and has not heard of the mark or is only vaguely familiar with it, then 
the mark is probably not “famous” for purposes of antidilution protection.  After all, the 
plaintiff seeks exclusive rights in its mark across all product categories and should be 
able to show that its fame is at least as extensive.  If the plaintiff falls back to arguing that 
its mark is “famous” in some area of commerce with which the finder of fact happens not 
to be familiar (either because of his or her age, geographic location, consuming habits, or 
lack of fashion sense), then this is a good sign that the plaintiff’s mark is not, in fact, 
“famous” for purposes of antidilution protection.  The TDRA is simply not intended to 
protect trademarks whose fame is at all in doubt. 
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unwieldy list of eight factors.87  The TDRA shortens this list to 
four: first, the extent of advertising of the mark; second, the extent 
of sales of goods offered under the mark; third, the “extent of 
actual recognition of the mark;” and fourth, whether the mark is 
registered on the principal register.88  This is a curious formulation 
of factors.  As an empirical matter, the first and second factors are 
subsidiary to and are logically incorporated by the third factor—
the “extent of actual recognition of the mark.”89  A court should 
not grant antidilution protection to reward—i.e., to promote—
spending on advertising, just as it should not grant such protection 
in recognition of something like the plaintiff’s good faith in trying 
as hard as it can to make its mark famous.  What we are concerned 
with are the facts on the ground, the “actual” fame of the mark.  
The first two factors in particular should only help us to determine 
the outcome of this third and by far most important factor.  
Otherwise, they are mere formal distractions from what should in 
all events be a purely empirical—and, ideally, a survey-based—
analysis.  The fourth factor, concerning the registration status of 
the mark, is arguably irrelevant to the fame analysis.  At best, it 
could weigh against a finding of fame on the assumption that the 
plaintiff did not consider the mark to be of sufficient value to 
justify registration.  But the mere fact that a mark is registered 
cannot logically weigh in favor of a finding that it is famous. 
2. Inherent Distinctiveness and Famousness 
Notably absent from the TDRA’s new list of factors to be 
considered in assessing the fame of the mark is any reference to the 
degree, if any, of inherent distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark.  
 87 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)–1125(c)(1)(H). 
 88 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–
1125(c)(2)(A)(iv)).  The version of the Act reported to the House proposed only three 
factors to determine the degree of recognition of the mark.  See id.  The fourth factor, 
concerning the registration status of the mark, appears to have been added to the version 
of the Act subsequently reported to the Senate.  See S. 683., 109th Cong. §2. 
 89 Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(iii)).  Cf. Barton Beebe, An 
Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 45, on file with author) (noting that the assessment of 
a mark’s “actual” marketplace strength logically incorporates the effects of its inherent 
strength). 
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Indeed, in addressing the issue of famousness, the Act avoids 
altogether the term “distinctiveness” and instead refers to the 
“degree of recognition” of the mark.90  Elsewhere, the Act amends 
Section 43(c)(1) to provide protection to the owner of a famous 
mark “that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired 
distinctiveness . . . .”91  It may therefore appear that the Act 
repudiates outright the controversial Second Circuit reading of the 
FTDA that limits antidilution protection only to marks which are 
inherently distinctive. 
It is important to recognize, however, that this need not be the 
case.  The Act’s list of factors to be considered in assessing 
famousness is non-exclusive: “the court may consider all relevant 
factors, including the following . . .”92  Thus, it is consistent with 
the provisions of the Act for the Second Circuit to continue to 
factor in a mark’s degree of inherent distinctiveness in assessing 
the mark’s fame.  In light of the language of the new Section 
43(c)(1), the Second Circuit may not establish a per se rule that 
only inherently distinctive marks will qualify as “famous” under 
the TDRA, but it may continue to consider inherent 
distinctiveness—indeed, to weight it strongly—in its analysis of 
the mark’s “degree of recognition” as a “designation of source of 
the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”93  As an empirical 
matter, non-inherently distinctive marks such as UNITED or 
AMERICAN may be widely recognized as designations of source, 
but not necessarily as designations of source of the plaintiff’s 
goods in particular. 
Furthermore, as we will see below, the TDRA sets out factors 
that courts should consider in determining whether the plaintiff’s 
mark is likely to be blurred, and there, the mark’s “degree of 
inherent or acquired distinctiveness” is explicitly incorporated as a 
factor.94  Arguably, though now in need of some tailoring, Second 
 90 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)). 
 91 Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)). 
 92 Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)). 
 93 Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)).  On why a court may want to weigh 
the inherent distinctiveness of a plaintiff's mark against the plaintiff, see Levy, supra note 
4, at 1207–08. 
 94 See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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Circuit inherent distinctiveness doctrine remains alive and well—
or at least, given sufficient judicial interest, could remain alive and 
well—under the TDRA. 
3. The Ironies of Anti-Blurring Protection for “Famous” 
Marks 
There are two ironies to anti-blurring protection for “famous” 
marks.  The first is well-recognized.  It is that the very marks 
which are so famous as to deserve anti-blurring protection already 
receive the same scope of protection from source-confusion-based 
anti-infringement protection.95  Unlike those of Schechter’s time, 
modern branding practices routinely leverage brands into new 
product areas.  This has conditioned consumers to expect that a 
trademark will appear on products far afield from the products on 
which the trademark normally appears.  For example, where the 
mark HARLEY-DAVIDSON originally appeared only on motorcycles 
and closely-related paraphernalia, now it can be found on a wide 
variety of more or less ridiculous products and services.96  The 
result is that if a famous brand name, particularly an inherently 
distinctive one such as INTEL or NIKE were to appear on nearly any 
product, regardless of its nature, it is likely that consumers would 
assume that that product originates from the same company 
responsible for all the other products bearing the brand name—or, 
at least, that it is likely that an injunction would issue on that 
basis.97  Relatedly, as a matter of trademark doctrine, because the 
 95 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 6, at 687; Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The 
Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 
846–47 (1997); Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 90 
TRADEMARK REP. 823, 834–41 (2000). 
96 This is as good an example as any of what Sara Stadler has termed self-dilution.  See 
generally Nelson, supra note 6.  Cf. Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and 
Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 1006 (1999) (discussing the 
downscaling of brands and observing that “[u]ntil the trademark loses its cachet, these 
activities will bring happiness—lots of designer utility—to people who might not 
otherwise be able to afford it”). 
97 My colleague Justin Hughes raises the examples of “DISNEY cigarettes” or “INTEL 
garbage collecting services” as uses of famous marks on goods sufficiently unrelated to 
the goods to which the marks are traditionally attached that consumer confusion as to 
source would not likely occur.  These are persuasive counterexamples on the issue of the 
actual likelihood of consumer confusion in the marketplace.  However, courts have 
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scope of anti-infringement protection expands with the strength of 
the mark, famous brands enjoy an extraordinarily broad scope of 
protection, likely extending across all product categories.  Thus, 
for the marks which truly deserve it, anti-blurring protection is 
mostly superfluous and is not uncommonly treated as such by 
federal courts. 
The second irony is not well-recognized and strikes to the heart 
of anti-blurring doctrine.  It is that the very marks which are so 
famous as to deserve anti-blurring protection are essentially 
immune to blurring on account of their overriding fame.  We have 
long lacked empirical knowledge of how trademark blurring works 
and how it can be measured.  The one good exception is work by 
Jacob Jacoby, the leading survey expert in American trademark 
law, along with Maureen Morrin.  In 2000, Morrin and Jacoby 
reported the results of a study they designed to assess the accuracy 
and speed of subjects’ memory retrieval of brand information after 
subjects were exposed to potentially brand-diluting stimuli.98  In 
other words, they sought to measure blurring. One of their findings 
is quite striking: “It appears that very strong brands are immune to 
dilution because their memory connections are so strong that it is 
difficult for consumers to alter them or create new ones with the 
same brand name.”99
This finding touches upon a fundamental problem in trademark 
doctrine, one which most students of trademark law quickly 
recognize and are told just as quickly to forget in a sort of “move 
along, nothing to see here” manner.  The problem is that trademark 
doctrine protects strong marks far more than it does weak marks; it 
treats the strongest brands as also the most fragile brands.  
shown a willingness to enjoin such uses in the name of preventing consumer confusion 
when it is clear that the court is actually seeking to prevent tarnishment or 
misappropriation.  Consumer confusion as to source has proven to be a very flexible legal 
concept.  See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 
642 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding, in a case of clear parody, that “there is 
a likelihood of confusion as to origin, approval, endorsement or other association of the 
Garbage Pail Kids’ products and mark with the plaintiff[‘s Cabbage Patch Kids products 
and mark]” (emphasis added)). 
 98 Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an 
Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL. & MARKETING 265 (2000). 
 99 Id. at 274. 
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Consider the situation in Moseley.  There, the plaintiff argued that 
its brand—VICTORIA’S SECRET—was so strong as to be famous, 
perhaps even a household word.100  But then the plaintiff argued 
that the use of VICTOR’S SECRET by one Victor Moseley as the 
name of his store in a strip-shopping center in Elizabethtown, 
Kentucky, that crossroads of the world, would damage the 
VICTORIA’S SECRET brand to such an extent that Moseley’s use 
should be enjoined.101  One wonders, if so trivial a use can damage 
a brand name so much as to merit a federal court’s injunction, then 
perhaps the brand name isn’t so strong after all. 
For apologists of anti-blurring protection, this is an old and 
tiresome argument, which they meet with two standard responses.  
The first is to speak of a slippery slope, of “death by a thousand 
cuts” or the “first of a hundred bee stings.”102  But perhaps it is 
time to challenge this facile response.  As an initial matter, like the 
FTDA before it, the TDRA does not establish a slippery slope 
standard.  It asks whether the defendant’s use is itself “likely to 
cause dilution,” not whether the defendant’s use together with 
some number of other similar uses sometime in the future would 
be likely to cause dilution.103  Moreover, the only good empirical 
knowledge we have of how trademark dilution works suggests that 
truly famous marks are much stronger than we thought, that there 
may be no slippery slope, that the first “cut” or the thousandth may 
never draw blood.  Courts should not take the slippery slope for 
granted.  Rather, anti-blurring plaintiffs should be required to show 
not only that others are likely to do as the defendant has done, but  
 
 
 100 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 424–25 (2003). 
 101 Id. at 424. 
 102 For a fine discussion of these metaphors, see Petitioners’ Reply Brief on the Merits 
at 7–9, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015). 
 103 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)).  
Admittedly, the lack of statutory language in support of a slippery slope standard has not 
prevented courts from reading such a standard into the fourth fair use factor in copyright 
law.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000); Sony Corp. of Am. v Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (stating that the plaintiff must prove “either that the particular 
unauthorized use is harmful, or that if the use should become widespread, it would 
adversely affect the . . . market for the copyrighted work”); A&M Records v. Napster, 
239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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also that these uses will indeed be likely to blur the plaintiff’s 
brand name.  As it stands, the slippery slope argument in anti-
blurring doctrine is a formalism that distracts from marketplace 
reality, and the reality, if the empirical evidence can be credited, is 
that blurring is far less common and far less of a threat than we 
might have thought. 
The second response of trademark apologists goes to the issue 
of misappropriation or “free-riding.”  The argument is that when a 
court enjoins someone like Moseley from using a variation of a 
famous brand, the court seeks to prevent not so much the blurring 
as the misappropriation of the mystique or “selling power” of the 
famous brand.104  Thus, though Moseley’s use may itself cause 
little or no harm to the VICTORIA’S SECRET brand name, still, 
Moseley is reaping where he has not sown and should be prevented 
from doing so.105   While this may be a sound basis for judicial 
intervention under some other area of law, the TDRA is, on its 
plain language, not a misappropriation statute, nor for that matter 
was the FTDA.  Where, by comparison, the antidilution article of 
the EC Trademark Directive explicitly prohibits conduct that 
“takes unfair advantage of . . . the distinctive character or the 
repute of the trade mark,”106 the American Congress has now had 




 104 See generally Franklyn, supra note 25, at 117 (“[W]hile American dilution law 
purports to be about preventing dilutive harm, it really is about preventing free-riding on 
famous marks.”).  See also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(Posner, J.) (discussing an anti-free riding rationale for antidilution protecition). 
105 See generally Franklyn, supra note 25. 
 106 Council Directive 89/104, art. 5(2), 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1, 5 (EC).  Article 5(2) reads in 
full as follows: 
Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to 
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade 
any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to 
goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is 
registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use 
of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, 
the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark. 
Id.  See generally Ilanah Simon, Dilutive Trade Mark Applications: Trading on 
Reputations or Just Playing Games?, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 67 (2004). 
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not done so.  Rather, in language that was the result of a quite 
deliberate drafting process, the Act establishes that only uses 
which “impair[] the distinctiveness” or “harm the reputation” of 
the famous mark will be enjoined.107  Misappropriation per se is 
not actionable under Section 43(c).108
B. The New Blurring: Guilt by “Association” 
1. The TDRA’s Four-Part Definition of “Dilution by 
Blurring” 
The TDRA defines two forms of dilution: “dilution by 
blurring” and “dilution by tarnishment.”  The Act defines dilution 
by blurring as “association arising from the similarity between a 
designation of source and a famous mark that impairs the 
distinctiveness of the famous mark.”109  The term “association” is, 
of course, extraordinarily broad in meaning and may appear to give 
little guidance to the courts.  One dictionary defines it as “the 
mental connection or bond existing between any sensations, 
perceptions, ideas, or feelings that to a subject or observer have a 
relational significance with one another.”110  Fortunately, the 
definition of dilution by blurring contains important limitations on 
what kind of “association” is actionable.  On the language of the 




 107 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)). 
 108 Franklyn’s defense of what is arguably the strongest basis for antidilution protection 
is compelling. See generally Franklyn, supra note 25.  Nevertheless, the language of the 
FTDA and TDRA does not contemplate a misappropriation cause of action. 
 109 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)). 
 110 WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986).  The term “association” is 
used elsewhere in the Lanham Act.  Section 43(a)(1)(A) prohibits the use in commerce of 
a mark which is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of [a] person with another person.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).  This notion of “association” is based on confusion as 
to source: A consumer must associate the parties’ marks in a way that leads the consumer 
to assume that the parties are somehow affiliated.  In anti-blurring doctrine, by contrast, a 
consumer associates the parties’ marks to the extent that she sees the marks as similar, 
but is nevertheless aware that the parties themselves are otherwise entirely unrelated. 
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defendant’s blurring speech is perceived by consumers as a 
designation of source, i.e., as a “mark or trade name,” for the 
defendant’s goods; second, that consumers make an association, 
i.e., a “mental connection [of] relational significance,” between the 
plaintiff’s mark and the defendant’s mark; third, that consumers do 
so because of the similarity between the two marks; and fourth, 
that this association “impairs the distinctiveness” of the plaintiff’s 
mark.111  I consider here in turn each of these aspects of the Act’s 
definition of dilution by blurring. 
First, in specifically requiring that the defendant’s blurring 
speech take the form of a “mark or trade name,” the Act makes 
clear that the anti-blurring provisions of Section 43(c) will not 
prohibit speech that consumers perceive as non-source-distinctive, 
such as advertising copy or a non-distinctive description of the 
defendant’s goods.  In essence, then, the plaintiff must show that 
the defendant’s mark (or trade name) would qualify for protection 
under the Lanham Act as a designation of source but for the fact 
that it blurs the plaintiff’s mark.  The anti-blurring plaintiff may 
thus find itself in the awkward position of arguing in favor of the 
“distinctiveness” of the defendant’s mark, however descriptive and 
lacking in secondary meaning it may otherwise appear to be.  For 
example, if the plaintiff sells its computers under the trademark 
APPLE, and the defendant establishes a website with the domain 
name applecomputerrepairs.com or a store called Apple Computer 
Repairs, then the anti-blurring plaintiff will be required to show 
that consumers perceive the defendant’s speech as a “mark,” i.e., 
as distinctive of the defendant’s source, as having secondary 
meaning, rather than as merely a description of what the defendant 
does or a reference to the plaintiff’s source.  Consider another 
example.  If the plaintiff sells its automobiles under the mark FORD 
and the defendant manufactures automobile floor mats with the 
mark FORD embossed on them (to match the interior of the car), 




 111 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)). 
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the embossment as distinctive of the defendant’s source rather than 
the plaintiff’s.112  To the extent that the plaintiff shows that 
consumers perceive the embossment as distinctive of the plaintiff’s 
source, then the plaintiff is showing consumer confusion under 
Section 32 or Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, not blurring under 
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.113
Second, in requiring that the plaintiff show “association” in 
addition to “similarity,” the Act requires that the plaintiff do more 
than merely show that its mark is similar to or identical with the 
defendant’s mark.  Otherwise, why bother including the 
“association” requirement?  In the aftermath of Moseley, some 
courts have concluded that if the parties’ marks are identical, then 
blurring may be presumed.114  This presumption is inconsistent 
with the language of the new Act, however, if not also with the 
empirical work referenced above.115  To conclude simply that two 
marks are similar or identical is an essentially formal 
determination; a judge may make this fairly arid finding without 
reference to the marketplace.  But to conclude further that 
consumers associate the two marks, be they identical or merely 
similar, requires an empirical analysis of the marketplace itself.  
The plaintiff must establish that consumers are exposed or likely to 
be exposed to both marks and, upon being exposed to them, 
actually connect or are likely to connect the two marks in their 
minds.  Consider examples from the marketplace: UNITED for 
airlines and for moving services, ACE for bandages and for 
 112 Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Lloyd Design Corp., 184 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(finding dilution where the defendant manufactured automobile floor mats bearing the 
plaintiff’s trademarks). 
113 Relatedly, the Act provides no antidilution cause of action for conduct in the nature 
of keyword or pop-up advertising.  Cf. 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400 
(2d Cir. 2005); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 2005 WL 1903128 
(E.D.Va. 2005); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 273 (E.D.Va. 
2003).  In these situations, the harm, if any, to the plaintiff does not arise from any 
similarity between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s marks.  Rather, the defendant, be it 
a search engine company, a pop-up advertising company, or a buyer of their services, is 
using or instructing computers to use the plaintiff’s mark as a signifier of the plaintiff.  
See generally Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark 
Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 371 (2006); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in 
Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005). 
 114 See supra note 58. 
 115 See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
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hardware stores, LEXIS for information services and LEXUS for 
automobiles, APPLE for computers and APPLE for banking services, 
TIME for the magazine and TIME for the cafe on Broadway in 
Manhattan, BALLY for fitness clubs and for high-end leather goods, 
etc.  It is not clear as an empirical matter that consumers actually 
make a “mental connection” between these marks notwithstanding 
the identity or close-similarity of the marks as a formal matter.116  
And certainly, in establishing the further requirement of 
“association,” the Act itself appears to recognize that some 
similarities or identities will not lead to “association.”  In sum, the 
TDRA requires plaintiffs to present evidence beyond the mere fact 
of the “similarity” between the parties’ marks to show that this 
“similarity” actually produces or is likely to produce “association” 
in the minds of consumers. 
Third, in requiring that the plaintiff show that “association” 
arises from “the similarity between a mark or trade name and a 
famous mark,” the Act recognizes that some associations will arise 
from sources other than the similarity of the parties’ marks.  Thus, 
if consumers associate the two marks only because the products to 
which they are affixed have similar characteristics, then no action 
for blurring will lie.  More difficult is the question of two marks 
that are dissimilar as written but similar in connotation.  An 
example is HÄAGEN-DAZSYOPLAIT and FRUSEN GLÄDJÉLA YOGURT, 
both for ice cream.117  In such cases, it is likely that a court will 
look to the remainder of the Act’s definition of dilution by blurring 
to conclude that though a consumer’s association between the two 
marks may stem from their similarity in connotation, this 
association is nevertheless not actionable.  The consumer’s 
association between the marks may impair the distinctiveness of 
both brand’s connotations, but it does not impair the 
distinctiveness of the brand names themselves, at least not in a way 
that antidilution protection, for all of its scope, is willing to 
 116 However, even if consumers do not in the first instance make a mental connection 
between these marks, it may be worth recognizing that search engines such as Google 
may make an association between such marks to which consumers may then be exposed.  
The emergence of what might be termed “machine association” may give plaintiffs a 
reasonable means of persuading a court that similarities between marks will, at least in 
the internet context, give rise to an association between the marks. 
117 Cf. Häagen-Dazs, Inc. v. Frusen Glädjé Ltd. 493 F.Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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prevent.  Think of what might otherwise result.  As an example, 
one German beer manufacturer could seek to prevent all other 
German beer manufacturers from giving German-sounding names 
to their beers.  The exclusive right to a connotation would lead to 
the exclusive right to an entire language or variations on it.118  In 
light of this problem, which goes not simply to languages but also 
to fields of connotation, similarity analysis for purposes of anti-
blurring protection should tread lightly when it extends its analysis 
beyond similarities of sight and sound to consider similarities of 
meaning. 
Fourth, and in the pattern of the reasoning above, the Act 
makes clear that the plaintiff must present evidence beyond the 
mere fact of “similarity” arising from “association” to show that 
the defendant’s mark “impairs the distinctiveness” of the plaintiff’s 
mark.  After all, as above, if a showing of association arising from 
similarity were enough, then there would be no need to include this 
further requirement.  Here, the term “distinctiveness” means 
distinctiveness of source.  It does not mean uniqueness or what I 
have elsewhere called “differential distinctiveness,” i.e., 
distinctiveness from other marks.119  On its plain language, the Act 
establishes a cause of action for “blurring” in the minds of 
consumers, not for the loss of uniqueness in the marketplace.  
Thus, the plaintiff must show, as an empirical matter, that 
consumers who are exposed to both the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s marks are less competent to make a “mental 
connection” between the plaintiff’s mark and the plaintiff’s source, 
and plaintiffs must do so in the face of empirical evidence that 
suggests that, for very strong marks, this loss of consumer 
competence is unlikely.120  Mere formal reasoning along the lines 
of “if similarity, then association, and if association, then 
118 See id. at 75 (“This suit is grounded in plaintiff’s failure to appreciate the difference 
between an attempt to trade off the good will of another and the legitimate imitation of an 
admittedly effective marketing technique. . . . [W]hen consumers became increasingly 
aware of the ingredients in food products, producers rushed to extoll the virtues of their 
‘all natural’ products.  It would be ludicrous, however, to suggest that in our free 
enterprise system, one producer and not another is permitted to take advantage of the ‘all 
natural’ marketing approach to enhance consumer reception of its product.”) 
 119 See Beebe, supra note 6. 
120 See Morrin & Jacoby, supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
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impairment of distinctiveness” will not suffice.  This was Judge 
Phillips’ essential insight in his Ringling Bros. opinion121 and the 
Supreme Court could not have been clearer in Moseley in its 
statement of this fundamental point: “‘Blurring’ is not a necessary 
consequence of mental association.”122  In explicitly calling for a 
showing of impairment of distinctiveness, the TDRA has, very 
much to its credit, only reinforced this basic premise. 
2. The Blurring Factors 
How then might a court determine whether the defendant’s 
mark does or will “impair the distinctiveness” of the plaintiff’s 
mark?  The Act sets forth a non-exclusive list of six factors that 
courts may consider in making this determination: 
(i) The degree of similarity between the designation of 
source and the famous mark. 
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of 
the famous mark. 
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is 
engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark. 
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. 
(v) Whether the user of the designation of source intended 
to create an association with the famous mark. 
(vi) Any actual association between the designation of 
source and the famous mark.123
Two of these factors are particularly interesting, and they 
highlight the difference between the subject matter of anti-blurring 
protection and the scope of anti-blurring protection.  While the Act 
elsewhere explicitly provides that non-inherently distinctive marks 
come within the subject matter of anti-blurring (and anti-
121 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Development,  170 F.3d 449, 458–61 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 122 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003). 
 123 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–
1125(c)(2)(B)(vi)). 
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tarnishment) protection, the second factor allows that the scope of 
this protection for non-inherently distinctive marks may be quite 
thin.  The third factor does the same and more.  A mark such as 
APPLE for computers is “arbitrary” and thus inherently distinctive.  
Nevertheless, it is used by several other firms, most notably the 
record production company and the bank that go by the same 
name.  This may function to narrow the scope of anti-blurring 
protection for such marks even though they are inherently 
distinctive.  This is a progressive development and makes sense 
from the point of view of competition.  Firms do not likely need to 
use the entirely fanciful marks (e.g., NOVARTIS, ACCENTURE) of 
other firms, but they may need or want to use the marks of other 
firms that are arbitrary (e.g., ACE, TIME) or suggestive (e.g., 
CATERPILLAR) with respect to those other firms’ products.124
As for the other factors, they are very much in the mainstream 
of anti-blurring doctrine.  On the first factor, the court must limit 
its assessment of similarity to the parties marks themselves and 
may not consider the similarity of the parties advertising or non-
source-distinctive trade dress.  This is required both by the 
language of the first factor and the Act’s definition of blurring.125  
With respect to the fifth factor, the court should consider the 
defendant’s intent on the assumption—made familiar by 
consumer-confusion analysis126—that if the defendant intended to 
create an association with the plaintiff’s mark, we may assume that 
the defendant was successful in doing so.  Again, however, the 
mere creation of an “association” does not necessarily lead to the 
impairment of distinctiveness.  This maxim applies as well to the 
sixth factor, which calls for survey or anecdotal evidence of 
“association.”  The plaintiff must present evidence of a sufficient 
degree of association, just as it must show a sufficient degree of 
similarity and recognition, to show that the defendant’s mark does 
124 It is interesting in this regard that in the conclusion of his 1927 article, Schechter 
spoke of providing antidilution protection only to “coined” marks, Schechter, supra note 
5, at 830, whereas earlier in the article he spoke of providing such protection to 
“arbitrary, coined, or fanciful” marks, id. at 828. 
 125 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)). 
 126 See, e.g., Cable News Network L.P., L.L.L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 
520 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“one who intends to confuse is more likely to succeed in doing 
so”). 
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or is likely to impair the source distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s 
mark. 
C. “Tarnishment” and Dilution 
The Act defines dilution by tarnishment as “association arising 
from the similarity between a designation of source and a famous 
mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”127  This 
definition of tarnishment may be parsed in the same way that the 
Act’s definition of blurring was parsed above.  The plaintiff must 
show, first, that the defendant is tarnishing the plaintiff’s mark by 
means of something that consumers perceive as a designation of 
source of the defendant’s goods; second, that consumers perceive 
an “association” between the parties’ marks; third, that this 
association arises from the “similarity” of the parties’ marks; and 
fourth, that this association harms or is likely to harm the 
reputation of the famous mark. 
The first aspect of the Act’s definition of tarnishment may very 
well play a crucial role in limiting the reach of anti-tarnishment 
protection under the Act.  Consider a t-shirt or bumper sticker that 
states “Wal-Mart is Evil.”  This conduct, though certainly 
tarnishing, is not prohibited under the Act.  The reason is that in 
neither of these cases will consumers perceive these signs as 
designations of the source of the defendants’ goods.  Similarly, a 
motion picture about the exploitation of service industry workers 
that prominently features the Wal-Mart mark would also not be 
enjoinable under the Act.  The motion picture is not using the mark 
as a designation of the source of the motion picture—though, of 
course, the motion picture is using the plaintiff’s mark as a 
designation of source of the plaintiff’s goods.128  For this reason, 
 127 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C)). 
 128 Cf. Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003).  
Consider other canonical cases in anti-tarnishment law.  Neither “Michelob Oily” nor 
“Enjoy Cocaine” nor the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders uniform would be seen as 
designations of source of the defendant’s goods and thus would not be enjoinable under 
the anti-tarnishment provisions of the TDRA, though courts might conceive of some 
category of “conjectural goods” as the basis for an injunction.  See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 
v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 
346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat 
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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analysis of appropriationist art is also greatly simplified.129 As 
above with respect to blurring, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
showing that the defendant’s speech would qualify for protection 
under the Lanham Act as a designation of source for the 
defendant’s goods but for the fact that it tarnishes the plaintiff’s 
trademark.130
The third aspect of the Act’s definition of tarnishment provides 
another important and related limitation on the reach of the Act’s 
anti-tarnishment protection.  The plaintiff can only claim anti-
dilution protection against harmful associations that arise from the 
“similarity” of the parties’ marks.  Thus, the tarnishing alteration 
of the plaintiff’s mark131 or the placing of the mark in a tarnishing 
 129 Cf. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003).  
There, the defendant would have been able quite easily to show that he is not using the 
BARBIE trademark or doll as a designation of source of his own goods. 
 130 Consider, finally, a website under the domain name walmart.net that engages in 
extensive negative commentary about the retail chain.  The proprietor of the website may 
be liable for initial interest confusion, but in no event would it be liable for tarnishment 
unless the court is willing to find that consumers perceive the walmart.net domain name 
as a designation of source of the defendant’s goods or services.  To the extent that the 
court finds that consumers perceive the domain name as a designation of source of the 
plaintiff’s goods or services, then the court must limit its analysis to a consumer 
confusion cause of action, not a tarnishment cause of action.  For similar reasons, the use 
of the WAL-MART trademark throughout the website would also not be grounds for an 
anti-tarnishment cause of action under the TDRA unless the court is willing to find that 
consumers perceive these uses as referring to the defendant’s goods or services rather 
than the plaintiff’s. 
The basis of antidilution doctrine as set forth it the TDRA is that consumers perceive two 
separate entities using two similar or identical designations of source; the junior mark 
may then either blur or tarnish the senior mark.  But if consumers believe that the junior 
entity is using the senior entity’s mark simply to refer to the senior entity rather than as a 
designation of source for the junior entity, then the senior entity has no basis for an anti-
tarnishment cause of action.  There are no longer two designations of source.  Rather, 
there is the senior entity’s designation of source and the junior’s nominative use of that 
designation. 
 131 Cf. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).  In Deere, the defendant 
aired a television commercial that showed a stylized depiction of the plaintiff’s mark 
being chased around the screen by a stylized depiction of the defendant’s mark and a 
barking dog.  The Second Circuit held, under New York law, that: 
Alterations of that sort, accomplished for the sole purpose of promoting a 
competing product, are properly found to be within New York’s concept of 
dilution because they risk the possibility that consumers will come to attribute 
unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate the mark with 
inferior goods and services. 
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context132 are not actionable under the TDRA.  In neither case do 
the tarnishing associations arise from the similarity of the parties 
marks.  To the extent that such conduct is actionable under state 
antidilution doctrine, state law may very well be preempted as 
being in conflict with the intentions of the TDRA.133
IV. CONCLUSION 
Schechter’s original theory of trademark dilution and 
antidilution protection was indeed “radical.”  Fortunately, the 
TDRA does not implement anything like his original theory.  
Indeed, much confusion could be avoided in the case law and 
commentary by steering clear of the muddled term “dilution” 
altogether.  What the Act provides is two very specific forms of 
trademark protection: anti-blurring protection and anti-tarnishment 
protection.  Plaintiffs will nevertheless urge courts to interpret the 
Act as an implementation of Schechter’s original theory and to find 
in the term “dilution” a receptacle for all imaginable harms to their 
marks.  Courts must resist this compulsion and they have no better 
basis for doing so than the specific language of the Act itself. 
Id. at 45.  The TDRA would not provide the plaintiff in Deere with an anti-tarnishment 
cause of action because the defendant merely altered the plaintiff’s mark.  In any event, 
there was no similarity in Deere between the plaintiff’s mark, altered or otherwise, and 
the defendant’s mark. 
 132 Cf. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (finding tarnishment where pornographic motion picture “Debbie Does 
Dallas” made extensive use of elements of the uniform of the Dallas Cowboy 
Cheerleaders); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, No. 76-3612, 1976 WL 
20994 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1976) (finding that title of pornographic motion picture “Tarz 
& Jane & Boy & Cheeta” “dilutes the value of the registered trademark Tarzan”). 
133 Cf. K. Keith Facer, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: A Whittling Away 
of State Dilution Statutes, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 863, 908–25 (2000).  The Act is 
careful to speak only of “dilution by blurring” and “dilution by tarnishment,” never of 
“dilution” tout seul.  The regulation of other forms of dilution may be understood to have 
been left to the states. 
